UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

(NABONI SAVAGE, a/k/a JOSEPH AMILL, a/k/a BONNIE, a/k/a Philadelphia, PA September 30, 2010 Defendant.

Defendant.

(NT-CR-550-3

(NT-CR-5

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE R. BARCLAY SURRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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(The following was heard in open court at 3:06 p.m.) 1 THE COURT: Please have a seat. All right, we have 2 the case of the United States versus Kaboni Savage. It's 3 number 7-550. Counsel, please identify yourselves. 4 MR. TROYER: Good afternoon, Your Honor, David 5 Troyer and Christine Sykes, Assistant US Attorneys for the 6 7 Government, and we're accompanied today at counsel table of 8 course by FBI Special Agent Kevin Lewis. 9 MS. SYKES: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. HOEY: Good afternoon, sir, Christian Hoey and 11 Timothy Sullivan on behalf of Kaboni Savage, here as well with 12 13 one of Mr. Sullivan's associates. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. SULLIVAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Counsel, we're here -there are three matters that we need to address. The first 17 18 matter, Mr. Hoey, I received a letter from your client and I 19 sent a copy of that letter to you. We're treating it as a 20 motion. He registered some concern about the representation 21 he was getting. Have you had a chance to talk to your client 22 about this? 23 MR. HOEY: Yes, sir. I have received it from the 24 I reviewed it personally as well with my client. My

client has indicated that he wishes to withdraw that motion

today, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Savage? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 4 THE COURT: You're satisfied with Mr. Hoey's representation? 5 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan's representation? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. And you want to -- you want the Court to mark this motion withdrawn? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 11 THE COURT: All right, we will do that. The next 12 13 item of business, there has been a joint motion to continue 14 filed in this matter. The defendants requested that this case be continued. It's scheduled now for trial in March and there 15 are other dates already on the schedule for different 16 17 deadlines. Mr. Hoey, you're requesting an extension or a 18 continuance for 180 days, is that -- is that what you're requesting --19 20 MR. HOEY: It is, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- of all the deadlines? 21 22 MR. HOEY: Yes, joint through the other attorneys for the other defendants, yes. We have reviewed that concept 23

with Mr. Savage, Mr. Sullivan and I that is, and he is in

agreement with that as with me, Your Honor, and we'd have no

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Colloquy

objection to the Court issuing an order extending the deadlines and continuing the case.

THE COURT: This matter was declared complex.

THE COURT: This matter was declared complex. There is a great deal of work that is going to go into preparing this case for trial. Mr. Troyer, does the Government have any position with regard to that?

MR. TROYER: No, we have no objection to the granting of the motion.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Savage, we've been talking about this request for continuance. Your attorney -your attorneys have asked for an extension of time, another
180 days to get this case ready for trial. It's scheduled for trial in March now, they want to move that trial to September.
You've talked to them about that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You're in agreement with that request?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Even though that request delays the trial, you think it's in your own best interest to do that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, we will grant that joint motion for a continuance and we will enter an order scheduling the matter in accordance with that motion.

Okay, finally there is a motion for relief from the Special Administrative Measures. Mr. Hoey and Mr. Sullivan,

you filed this motion, the Government has responded to it and I will hear whatever you wish to present with regard to that motion.

MR. HOEY: Yes, Your Honor. If the Court pleases, in terms of presenting the argument, I would ask the Court to consider a couple of different things. If I may approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOEY: With respect to the precedent already involved in this case in terms of modifying terms of confinement, I would argue the first issue that's on the table today is whether or not this case is in the right place in front of the right Judge and under the right circumstances, quite frankly.

The Government has argued in their response that the defendant has not exhausted his administrative remedies through the ARP process which is outlined in the regulations and that this matter is not ripe, nor should it be before Your Honor and it should be summarily dismissed.

I think that is the first issue that I would like to discuss with the Court. I think there is a case history involving this Court and Mr. Savage and the conditions of confinement that establishes somewhat of a precedent that this Court can rely on in terms of agreeing to handle this particular issue or issues that we've presented in this motion.

Hoey - Argument

Particularly, Your Honor, the defendant, as you may recall, was transferred from ADX, Colorado to The Metropolitan Correctional Center at the request of former counsel. The request essentially was based upon former counsel's inability to get the Colorado and effectively prepare for trial, and I believe that upon application to this Court, that condition of confinement -- meaning his situation in Colorado, was altered to allow him to go to New York, closer to counsel, Mr. Warren, in order for him to effectively prepare. So that is one condition that's already been modified, so to speak.

The second condition, the Court will recall Mr. Sullivan's request to allow personal contact with Mr. Savage in terms of preparing for trial and this Court modified further the conditions of confinement to allow Mr. Savage to come from MCC in New York down to the FDC two days per month for personal contact visits which would enable counsel and the defendant to exchange paperwork and have meaningful communications.

The third element of modification, if you will, I think was really done orally at the request of Mr. Sullivan back in February of this year wherein Mr. Sullivan had discovered that various pieces of communication and correspondence that he had sent to Mr. Savage had been opened by prison officials outside the presence of the inmate, despite the fact that the envelope and the letters were

conspicuously marked with the proper language required by the BOP that this was in fact attorney correspondence, that it should be opened in front of the inmate, and none of those steps were taken.

This Court admonished the Bureau to follow the guidelines and not to open mail outside the presence of the inmate. So there exists already a history within this case, Your Honor, of modification of the terms of confinement that I would argue that establishes enough precedent for this Court to adopt this particular petition, and then hear the substantive elements of it in an evidentiary hearing.

So that's the first response that we would have to the Government's position that it should be dismissed without hearing on the merits.

The second argument concerns simply the law, Your Honor, and the law we believe in this particular case happens to fall -- this particular case happens to fall squarely within well-established precedent in the Southern District of New York in several different cases, clearly establishing a precedent where a defendant waiting trial can challenge the terms of his confinement and challenge those terms with his Trial Judge in the particular district for which he's being prosecuted.

In <u>Basciano</u>, the Eastern District of New York decided in 2008, heard a petition that was filed by the

heard it, heard the substantive elements of it.

defendant in that particular case challenging -- making
similar challenges to what Mr. Savage is challenging in this
particular case. Mr. Basciano, the defendant in that matter,
challenged his ability to contact counsel. He made First
Amendment arguments in his petition and the District Judge
hearing his underlying criminal case actually adopted that
particular motion that was filed within that criminal case and

Therefore, we would ask the Court to consider that holding, which again is a 2008 holding. The same district in Hashmi was another matter which we've cited in our brief, is another case where the District Judge adopted a motion filed within the criminal prosecution by Defendant Hashmi and although it was not couched in terms of a 1983 action or under any type of civil complaint, he filed it directly as a motion within the criminal complaint -- the criminal case. The Court heard it.

The Court got over the first step of has the defendant exhausted his remedies -- his administrative procedure remedies, has the defendant properly placed the matter before the Trial Judge and in Hashmi, the Court concluded that there is no exhaustion prerequisite, similar to the way the Basciano Court ruled that there is no exhaustion requirement, the matter is ripe automatically and that that Court had heard that case without requiring the defendant to

exhaust any administrative remedy procedures.

Finally, in <u>US versus Lopez</u>, Your Honor, a similar case raised within the confines of the criminal case, that Court found that the PLRA exhaustion requirements were not related to a motion filed by the defendant in a criminal case. So I think within this particular case this Court has established a precedent of modifying terms of conditions.

Secondly, there is well-established precedent where criminal defendants have filed motions within their criminal cases and have been heard directly by their Trial Judges in the three cases that we've mentioned, all of which are cited in our brief.

And finally, Your Honor, I think it's an interesting point to note but should be noted nonetheless, and that is that the administrative remedies that are found in 28 CFR 501.3 and later in 28 CFR 542.10 and the following subsections of that all suggest that this is not -- this concept of exhaustion is not a prerequisite to getting this matter before a Judge.

Quite frankly, they also suggest in 501.3(e), Your Honor, that the affected inmate may seek review of the terms of confinement through this ARP process. It doesn't make it mandatory, it doesn't say shall or must proceed in that manner. These administrative remedy procedures are simply available to an inmate such as Mr. Savage.

Hoey - Argument

We'll get into the steps that he did take to challenge the terms of confinement, but there is this idea that the Court is being asked to accept that the defendant should somehow exhaust these remedies and these procedures prior to being heard by this Court and I don't think that that's correct.

I think most importantly, Your Honor, the Court should understand clearly that despite these procedures existing and outlined in 542.10 and the subsequent sections, the Attorney General is the only person that can modify the terms of confinement upon a request made by the inmate, that this procedure that the Bureau of Prisons has established through the regulations is a road to nowhere.

In essence, the inmate is being required to file petition after petition after petition to various people within the BOP where the BOP is essentially telling Mr. Savage in various responses, hey look, even if we felt these suggestions had merit, there's nothing we can do about it anyway. The Attorney General is the only person that can modify the SAMs.

And despite those requirements and despite the suggestion to the Court that he is to exhaust this administrative remedy procedure, there's really no hope within that procedure for Mr. Savage. Even if there are merits to his complaints, this process that's in place goes nowhere for

him. So for all of those reasons, I would ask the Court simply on argument to find that it does have jurisdiction over the substantive element of Mr. Savage's petition.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOEY: If the Court wishes testimony in evidence, we're prepared to present that but I think the argument, I'd like to lay out first, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Troyer?

MR. TROYER: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. Your

Honor, there's a statute, the Prisoner -- Prison Litigation

Reform Act, which requires inmate plaintiffs to exhaust their

administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons before

seeking redress from the Courts.

This is not a road to nowhere, I think is somewhat of a -- well, it's not a correct argument and the proof is in the pudding because we've had instances in this -- in this case where redress has been sought informally and with our office being involved and with the Bureau of Prisons being involved -- the regional office.

We have made -- we have made changes to the implementation of the SAMs, we have made changes to the conditions of confinement so it's hardly a road to nowhere. It is in fact something which is required. I mean, the Act clearly states, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of this Title or any

other Federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." And again, that's Title 42, Section 1997e, subsection (a).

Mr. Savage of course is a pretrial detainee. He's also a sentenced prisoner. He's already been convicted of witness tampering crimes -- he's -- as well as drug trafficking crimes. Those convictions were recently confirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Of course there are some cases -- Mr. Hoey has set forth a few cases -- District Court cases where District Courts came to the conclusion that an exhaustion of remedies -- exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required, however, there are many more cases including Third Circuit case law that says that in fact the PLRA does have to be upheld, that a prisoner does have to exhaust administrative remedies.

And of course I've set them out in my -- in my response. I won't go through each one but the -- we have the Eastern District of Virginia in <u>United States versus Ali</u>, the Southern District of New York in <u>United States versus Elmari</u> (phonetic), <u>United States versus Troya</u> -- that's T-R-O-Y-A -- from the Southern District of Florida, and the <u>United States versus Antonelli</u>, which is a Seventh Circuit case.

In the Seventh Circuit case, the defendant there did something similar -- not exactly the same but similar to what Mr. Savage is doing which is instead of filing a civil action or seeking redress under 1983, he filed it under a criminal case. The only difference there -- and I'll admit, there is a difference -- was that the criminal case then was at that time dormant.

But he filed it in the criminal case hoping to avoid this whole exhaustion of remedies. The Seventh Circuit told him he can't do that. In fact, the Seventh Circuit, there's an interesting quote from that opinion at page 362 of that opinion where they say, "Prisoners who play games to avoid the PLRA should not expect Courts to cooperate," and indeed, that's -- that's really the situation here.

Mr. Savage has some very distinct issues that he has raised, and I'm not saying that all of those issues don't need to be entertained, because they do. Each and every one should be listened to and they should -- but they should be listened to and entertained through the administrative process first.

Mr. Savage is well aware of this process.

Before I get to that, I just want to -- I don't want to forget to mention the Third Circuit case law in this which is well established, it goes back at least to 1988 in Lyons versus U.S. Marshals. The Third Circuit specifically ruled that a pretrial detainee litigant who was under SAMs

restrictions must exhaust his administrative remedies unless the prisoner is seeking only money damages, which of course is not the case in this instance. So there's Third Circuit case law that is I think directly on point and controlling in this case.

I recognize the <u>Hashmi</u> decision that was a District Court opinion in the Southern District of New York in 2008, however, I also pointed out in our response that there's some question about the viability of that decision. Nowhere in <u>Hashmi</u> did they discuss the <u>Nagy</u> situation -- the <u>Nagy</u> decision from 1996 which is a Second Circuit decision where the Court applied the PLRA to a motion filed by a criminal defendant and explained that what constitutes a "civil action" for the purposes of the PLRA depends on the substance of the prisoner's claims.

Plus, if he's seeking comparable relief to what might be afforded in a traditional suit under 1983 the PLRA still applies, and that's really what this is. This is undoubtedly -- this is all about conditions of confinement.

Mr. Savage has some arguments about the conditions of his confinement and how they impact some of his other constitutional rights, specifically his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in preparing for trial.

But, they are nevertheless conditions of confinement arguments and he has to go through that exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Now, what I'd like to do at this point is to kind of focus or crystallize the issue because -- and I don't know that I did that appropriately in my response because Mr. Savage has filed -- has taken different steps at different times and he has filed different pleadings in different forums.

And what he has done, there was a previous request to -- for BOP to eliminate or lift the SAMs conditions. He did file that. He filed that request for administrative remedies when he was in ADMAX in Colorado and he appealed that, the denial of his request, to the local warden and he appealed the denial of that request to the Regional Office of the Bureau of Prisons.

And once that was denied, he appealed it to the Central Office of the Bureau of Prisons, after which he filed a suit. That suit was dismissed. It was dismissed without prejudice, but it was dismissed. So he's familiar with the requirements of exhausting administrative remedies. He has fulfilled -- in that case he fulfilled those requirements.

What we have here though before us today I submit is really something a little bit different. What he is filing now today is he's asking for lifting of the SAMs restrictions, but he's also -- he's asking for it for specific reasons and he's asking for specific redress for specific instances which didn't even exist back when he filed his suit in Colorado, so

and for those, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

And again, just so the record is clear -- and all of these I believe are in the submissions given mostly by defense counsel who did file a rather comprehensive submission to the Court, but just for clarity purposes, April 28th, 2010, Mr. Savage filed a request -- a somewhat informal request for administrative remedies regarding his so-called dry cell in FDC Philadelphia.

Basically that was a complaint that when he was brought down for his April 21st, 2010 meeting with counsel --contact visit with counsel that he was placed in a cell that Mr. Savage felt was not adequate for his needs. There is a response filed to that request on May 20th, 2010.

Mr. Savage then sought an appeal of that and he filed a formal request for administrative remedies at MCC New York on May 27th, 2010, and on June 15th, 2010, he received a response from the Warden of MCC New York. With regard to that, that is where Mr. Savage's pursuit of those issues ended. Mr. Savage never filed any appeal with the Regional Office of BOP, never followed up, never sought any appeal anywhere.

Of course Mr. Savage again is well aware of the procedures because he followed the procedures in his previous suit in Colorado. He knew that he could file an appeal with

the BOP Regional Office and if that was denied, he could file an appeal to the Central Office. Indeed, again, he had done those before. In this case, he did not do these. Essentially to crystallize the issue, Your Honor, defense can't have it both ways.

Either this is the same complaint he listed in Colorado in which case his complaint was dismissed and if he wishes to, he could follow up and try to re-file it in the District of Colorado, or it's a different complaint, and I submit that it probably -- admittedly probably is a different complaint. And if it's a different complaint for different specific perceived transgressions and for specific different remedies, then he has to file the administrative remedies.

And now counsel, again, referred to this road to nowhere. It's a somewhat -- not only is it a somewhat insulting argument, but it's really not accurate and again, this case is a good example of how it's not accurate. You know, Mr. Hoey has -- or rather Mr. Savage placed in his motion, you know, certain -- you know, certain complaints and one of those complaints involved for instance his legal mail.

There was some arguments that his legal mail had either been opened or had been returned to counsel. I don't know of any situations where it was opened, however, there were admittedly when I viewed what was given to us by Mr. Hoey in the appendix or attachment, I saw that certain things had

been returned to counsel which at least to me looked like they were attorney -- attorney-client envelopes that should have been delivered to Mr. Savage.

We followed up with this. We followed up with the head of the SAMs Unit in MCC New York, Mr. Haas, who is extremely -- you know, communicative and extremely involved in this case and has been very receptive to both input from the Government and defense counsel, and we followed up with the Regional Office of the BOP and as a result, we obtained some changes to this.

In fact, I just received this week advice that they are going to relax some of their standards. Now, if the Court were to look at these -- and I don't suggest that the Court really needs to delve into the minutia of this, in fact, obviously we're arguing that you don't because he hasn't exhausted the administrative remedies.

But this is a good example of why he should exhaust administrative remedies and why a lot of these things could be handled either informally or through the Bureau of Prisons administratively and don't have to essentially -- pardon the expression -- bother the Court with these matters, is that -- you know, some of the envelopes that were sent, say for instance from Mr. Hoey's office, one of -- some of -- a couple of those envelopes didn't have Mr. Hoey's name on it, didn't have a law office name, it simply had the address.

Troyer - Argument

I think it's 50 Darby Road, Paoli, PA. That was obviously an oversight by somebody and I'm not suggesting --certainly not suggesting Mr. Hoey did it on purpose. He probably gave it to a legal assistant, she probably put it in an envelope and sent it out without really looking at it. So when somebody receives the mail at MCC New York, they don't know who this is coming from and so they sent it back.

That's actually legitimate, and Mr. -- you know, defendant's counsel do have some obligation to make sure that things that are sent to their clients in the institutions are correctly marked. They should be marked either legal mail or special mail, they should be marked with their law office or the fact that they're attorneys at law.

There were a couple of other instances I will tell you where it appeared -- especially I think there were a couple of things from Mr. Sullivan's office where it appeared that they really should have gone through and been given to Mr. Savage. We had that discussion.

I don't bring this out to air the dirty laundry and I certainly don't bring it out to criticize MCC New York and I certainly don't bring it out so that we can pat ourselves on the back or that I can congratulate -- you know, BOP Regional Office for assisting.

My point is that this could easily -- this didn't require a one-inch thick pleading with a one-inch thick or a

half-inch thick pleading with a one-inch thick attachment.

All it required was basically a phone call saying hey Dave,
this stuff isn't getting through, can you help us, or, even a
call to Mr. Haas or to Regional with counsel saying hey, we're
having some issues about the mail being delivered correctly,
can you intervene and make sure that this gets done. Had that
happened, it would have gotten done.

If for some reason all of us were either asleep at the switch or not -- not doing our jobs correctly at that point, certainly Mr. Savage could have asked for administrative remedies. Had he done that and had it gone to the BOP Regional Office, that matter would have been corrected, so it's a perfect example of how this is not a road to nowhere and how if Mr. Savage just simply followed the procedures of which he is well aware, we wouldn't be in this position.

What Mr. Savage is asking for -- and I know the Judge -- Your Honor doesn't necessarily want to get to the merits of this, we want to deal with the exhaustion issue first, but essentially Mr. Savage has some very limited and specific complaints which might require or at least if he's to be believed, limited and specific actions by somebody.

However, it certainly doesn't require the lifting of the SAMs motion and in this case, the SAMs motion is issued by the Attorney General, just to address I think counsel's last

point. However, it's issued by the Attorney General to be implemented by the Bureau of Prisons and there is some rather considerable latitude of discretion within the Bureau of Prisons as to how that SAMs is implemented and the example I just gave the Court I think is a perfect example of how the Bureau of Prisons does have discretion and can adequately deal with whatever issues concerning conditions of confinement that the defendant raises.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hoey?

MR. HOEY: Your Honor, in response, I think that the letter -- the correspondence concern is something that's kind of vital to our ability to actively and effectively defend our client and I think it's important that it was brought up because quite frankly, when I was in the MCC last week I received -- or I saw my client receive a letter that was completely obvious to be legal mail through the slot in his door, which was opened.

And I got the letter from him and I brought it today, and that letter is postmarked September 3rd of 2010 and it says on there, "Special mail, open in the presence of the inmate, Timothy J. Sullivan, Esquire," who is clearly on record at the prison as being co-counsel in the case. That is the fifth piece of mail that Mr. Sullivan has so marked that has been opened in advance of being distributed to my client, and my client did informally challenge that when I left the

prison that day, two weeks ago.

And when he asked the person who delivered the mail to him why it was that they were invading the -- the communications between counsel and himself, he was told by the gal at the prison that this is the way we do it at the MCC and you're going to have to deal with it.

And I can't conceive of a more egregious misstep and more egregious amount of arrogance in a facility that's housing somebody in conditions that are deplorable, quite frankly, to open their mail, stiff-arm them and tell them that that's the way it's going to be in a capital case where he's facing the death penalty, dealing with two separate counsel, the taxpayers are footing the bill, and now I have lost all confidence in the ability to communicate with my client through the mail because I have no idea what they're doing to my mail prior to delivering it to my client.

And quite frankly, Your Honor, it's in affront to our ability to represent him effectively, and it is not getting better and this mirage that exists through this administrative remedy procedure is exactly that.

THE COURT: Well, let's -- let's cut through it, Mr. Hoey. With regard to that administrative remedy procedure, will you agree that it has not been exhausted? I mean, we can get to the merits of the situation in a few minutes, but it seems clear to me --

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MR. HOEY: Here's how I would address --
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               THE COURT: -- it seems clear to me that the
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     argument that you're making is it's an exercise in futility,
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     not that it was pursued.
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               MR. HOEY: No, in fact, I'm not, Your Honor. What
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     I'm saying, and I think the Government would agree that at one
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     point in time when Mr. Savage was housed at ADX in Colorado,
     he did exhaust his administrative remedies. Now, it's -- it's
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     kind of interesting to say well, we slightly tweaked the SAMs
     when he went to New York, so you know what? This guy's got to
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     start the whole process all over again because we're now
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     allowing him to get a newspaper every third week.
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               THE COURT: Are you suggesting that what happened in
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     Colorado will take care of all problems in the future?
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               MR. HOEY: Well, I think what happened in Colorado
     is important because the core SAMs restrictions on Mr. Savage
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     have never changed. In fact, 99 percent of the SAMs
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     restrictions never changed when he went from Colorado to New
     York.
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               THE COURT: Well, did you in Colorado make
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     objections to counsel's ability to communicate with him?
               MR. HOEY: I was not counsel of record at that
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     point, Your Honor. I --
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               THE COURT: Well, did anyone?
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               MR. HOEY: I -- yes, I think Mr. Warren, the
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1 previous attorney.

THE COURT: And that went through the administrative process all the way to the end?

MR. HOEY: I don't think it did. I think what my client had raised there in Colorado was simple concepts that are again contained in his petition for the Court such as his ability to communicate with counsel, ability to communicate with his family, First Amendment concerns.

But this concept of look, if we tweak SAMs and we transfer him and just when he gets to the top of the hill we're going to tweak it and he's got to start the whole thing over again is indicative of this moving target that goes nowhere.

THE COURT: All right. So the bottom line is that there has not since he's been in New York been a complete exhaustion of the administrative remedies?

MR. HOEY: I think we'd like to put some evidence on to that effect, Your Honor, and I would -- I think the answer is yes, quite frankly, that he has exhausted those.

THE COURT: Well, tell me what he did. Did it go all the way to the end of the line?

MR. HOEY: Under -- under 542.10, Your Honor, 13, 14 and 15, he first starts with what's called an informal request to staff.

THE COURT: That's right, the informal request to

staff, then to the Warden --1 MR. HOEY: Under a BP-9. 2 THE COURT: -- then to the Regional Director, then 3 to General Counsel. Did you go that --4 5 MR. HOEY: Yeah, if I could confer with my --THE COURT: -- did you go that route? If you went 6 7 that route that's one thing. If you didn't go that route, it's quite another. 8 9 MR. HOEY: If I could stand down, Your Honor, I want to just make sure I'm speaking correctly on what -- because 10 there are so many filings in the case, because he has been in 11 several different facilities, I think it's important for me to 12 13 get the facts straight, Judge. THE COURT: I think it is too. 14 15 MR. HOEY: Yes. May I have a moment, Your Honor? THE COURT: Certainly. 16 17 (Off the record) 18 (Recording turned on after counsel starts speaking) MR. HOEY: -- deps taken and we have some documents 19 20 to support it. While he's at MCC, New York, Your Honor, he 21 filed the BP-8, which was ultimately denied. He then filed an administrative remedy to the Warden. He did not receive his 22 response from the Warden denying his request within the 20 23 24 days that he needed to file the appeal to the next level which

would be the Regional Director under a BP-10, therefore,

because they're holding his mail for a period of time that's extended at MCC New York, he's not getting the mail in a timely fashion and he's not able to appropriately and timely appeal any adverse decision, and that -- that is actually confirmed by what was taking place in Colorado.

He filed a <u>Bivens</u> action in Colorado and requested of the Court leave to proceed in forma pauperis. When he made that request he submitted his financial picture to the Court to support his in forma pauperis petition. He received from the Court ten days too late the permission to do that and unfortunately, the order that granted him permission to proceed in forma pauperis was time sensitive.

Because he received it late, he could not in time file the necessary paperwork and pay the necessary fees and ultimately his <u>Bivens</u> action was dismissed. That's just illustrating how the time sensitive materials that he's getting and not getting in time quite frankly is hampering his ability to pursue the process appropriately.

So the short answer is no, he has not exhausted the administrative remedies in New York. The long answer is there's a reason and that's because the time sensitive materials he's supposed to be getting in time aren't getting to him in time, so I think that -- that would be the answer to that, Your Honor.

I think there's also the way I see it possibly some

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24 25 confusion between the PLRA requirements and the requirements necessary to file a direct motion in the criminal case such as what we've done here. The cases that are cited by the Government are very -- it's a very important distinction, Your The Lyons case, Yousef versus Reno, and Nagy are all Honor. cases that were originally filings undertaken by the defendant -- the prisoner that is, under the Bivens Act, under the Bivens case, Your Honor.

These were civil suits filed in a separate Court with a separate Judge, thus implicating the judicial economy concept. But for instance, Nagy is a case where the Government says you know, Judge, you should rely on this In Nagy, the Second Circuit, which would have an holding. impact on Hashmi and the other matter that we discussed, the Basciano case -- Nagy rectifies all this.

Nagy doesn't rectify anything. Nagy -- in Nagy, the defendant filed a writ of mandamus simply seeking to get an answer about recusing his Trial Judge. He filed it under -couched it in a Bivens complaint which was ultimately dismissed because the Court there said he didn't exhaust his remedies and this particular request wasn't a Bivens type of request.

Nowhere in that case does it say any defendant in any criminal case cannot file a direct complaint in a motion in the criminal case unless he's exhausted his remedies.

Hoey - Argument doesn't say that at all. The only controlling cases that deal 1 with this concept directly are those that we've cited in our 2 brief. Hashmi is right on point, Basciano is right on point. 3 I think there is a very clear distinction between a prisoner's 4 5 Litigation Reform Act case filed under <u>Bivens</u> in a civil case -- civil setting, versus a criminal defendant raising this 6 7 issue directly within his case. I think the primary bottom line is the judicial 8 economy argument. Most of the Courts agree with that. I 9 10 think finally, Your Honor, in the Yousef case cited by the Government, the Court in that case says the Bureau of Prisons 11 does not have authority to modify SAMs. They recognize that 12 so why would an administrative remedy procedure be relevant? 13 14 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hoey, I'll take a look 15 at that issue and we'll deal with it ultimately. MR. HOEY: Yes, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: I think at this juncture we ought to 18 move forward and get into the issues that you've raised in the petition that was filed, specifically the First Amendment --19 20 the Sixth Amendment issues and the other issues that you have 21 raised.

MR. HOEY: Yes, Your Honor. May I confer with counsel a moment?

THE COURT: Yes, indeed.

(Pause in proceedings)

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1 MR. HOEY: May we see you at sidebar, Judge? 2 THE COURT: Certainly. (Sidebar discussion as follows:) 3 MR. HOEY: Your Honor, I would ask the Court allow 4 5 us to break for today based on our telephone conference of last week where we discussed kind of the issues that you 6 7 wanted to hear today. My thought was that today was designed specifically 8 to determine whether or not this Court would hear the 9 substantive element of the petition, whether it was in a 10 position to do so and legally if it could and whether there's 11 been enough evidence on the record or through the briefs or 12 13 through argument that would allow -- you know, convince the 14 Court one way or the other. We were not prepared to put the 15 substantive element of the case on today. THE COURT: Ms. Sykes, was that your understanding 16 17 as well? 18 MS. SYKES: Yes, Your Honor, that we would take this sort of as phase one and determine whether or not there was an 19 20 exhaustion. 21 THE COURT: Well, we need to get to phase two very There's no question about that. 22 quickly. Indeed. And one of the issues that 23 MR. TROYER: 24 comes up is that I know Mr. -- I know it's Mr. Hoey's stated

the intent to have an evidentiary hearing where he'll call

witnesses. It's the Government's position and in that conference call we made it rather clear that it's our position that there's no need to call a lot of witnesses, that there's plenty of submissions, there's plenty of a record for the Court to make a determination, and that it's not necessary to have live testimony and a full evidentiary hearing.

MR. HOEY: We may reach that conclusion. I mean, we may reach that conclusion, Judge. I don't think we're ready to do that today. We're certainly going to have to confer with Mr. Savage on that. I don't want to in any way affect his desire to testify if he wants to and put these things into the record himself.

Of course he -- you know, we understand the exposure element of that but if we could somehow reach an agreement by way of stipulations or submissions to the Court that would present this to you in a package as opposed to a full day of testimony or what have you, that might be a better way.

THE COURT: Well, I certainly will permit you to talk with the US Attorney and determine what you are able to do with regard to the situation. Getting back to the issue that is before the Court, is there any -- I kind of cut you off and to move forward, the question I have is do you have anything else --

(Sidebar interrupted)

PERSON IN GALLERY: I think something's wrong with

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my brother. Somebody check him. Get medical attention.
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     Something's wrong. Something's not right. I know him.
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     Something's not right. Give him medical attention. Listen --
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     you're not listening to me. I know he needs medical
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     attention.
               MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, can we have permission to
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     have Mr. Savage taken back for medical reasons?
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               THE COURT: Certainly.
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               MR. SULLIVAN: Do you want some water? Here's some
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     water.
               MR. HOEY: Yeah, he's sweating pretty bad. He's
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     sweating.
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               MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
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               MR. HOEY: Are you all right?
               MR. SULLIVAN: No, he's not breathing right either.
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               MR. HOEY: Pull him back from the table.
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               MR. SULLIVAN: Can you hear me?
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               THE DEFENDANT: What? I can hear you.
               MR. HOEY: Are you all right?
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               THE DEFENDANT: I'm all right.
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               MR. HOEY: Why don't you just go back for a second
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     and --
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               THE DEFENDANT: I'm all right. I'm all right.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Hoey and Mr. Sullivan, we're going
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     to recess --
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               No, go ahead, I'm all right.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Savage, we'll give you a couple of
     minutes.
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               MR. HOEY: He's like sweating profusely.
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               THE COURT: We can take a recess. It's no
     imposition.
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               MR. HOEY: He's not breathing right.
               THE COURT: We'll reconvene in ten minutes, okay?
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               MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE DEFENDANT: I'm all right.
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               (Recess taken, 3:52 p.m. to 4:16 p.m.)
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               THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hoey and Mr. Sullivan,
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     are we in a position to go forward?
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               MR. HOEY: We are, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right.
               MR. HOEY: I have provided the Government a copy of
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     each of the exhibits I intend to submit today. There will no
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     live testimony, but we would admit several documents into the
     record. Counsel has those. We'd ask the Court to consider
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     them in making a decision on this first issue that we
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     presented to the Court today.
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               THE COURT: All right. Mr. Troyer, do you have
     anything further?
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               MR. TROYER: Well, I certainly have no objection to
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     what counsel has shared with us and what he expects to
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Colloquy

1	present. The Government will also place we have a package
2	from the request for administrative remedy and the
3	documents that came from that including the last document
4	which is the response to the request from Warden Suzanne R.
5	Hastings of MCC New York dated June 15th, 2010. I've given a
6	copy of that to counsel and so the Government will submit that
7	as well.
8	I also have I also have an email from Mr. Haas to
9	Ms. Sykes and myself with a number of people CC'd on this
10	concerning the issue of the legal mail dated September 28th,
11	2010.
12	THE COURT: Why don't you give the exhibits both
13	of you, Mr. Hoey and Mr. Troyer, give the exhibits to Mr.
14	Finney. You can mark the exhibits Government's exhibits and
15	defendant's exhibits.
16	MR. HOEY: Judge, I have had an opportunity to
17	review those exhibits and documents. I have no objection to
18	the Court receiving them and reviewing them.
19	THE COURT: All right. And have you given your
20	documents to Mr. Finney to mark?
21	MR. HOEY: I haven't, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right.
23	MR. HOEY: May I identify those on the record?
24	THE COURT: Yes, indeed.

MR. HOEY: Your Honor, Defense Exhibit 1 would be a

two page document dated February 9 of 2007 notifying Mr.

Savage of the imposition of SAMs while he was an inmate at USP

Atlanta. Exhibit 2 would be the June 23, 2008 notification of modification of SAMs and renewal notice as well. Exhibit 3 is the May 15th, 2009 notification of extension of SAMs.

Exhibit 4 is the February 1, 2010 notification of extension of SAMs. Number 5 is an admission and orientation packet received by Mr. Savage upon his arriving at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The next exhibit is a two page request for administrative remedy form that Mr. Savage submitted to the Warden here at the Federal Detention Center on August 26th, 2004.

THE COURT: That's D-6.

MR. HOEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOEY: Number 7 is the habeas corpus petition filed by Mr. Savage in Atlanta. Exhibit 8 is a Central Office administrative remedy appeal filed by Mr. Savage in ADX Colorado, along with page two, which is the July 7th, 2008 order from Harold Watts, Administrator of the National Inmate Appeals Unit.

The next document is a package of material, Your

Honor, which is essentially Mr. Savage's civil action that he

filed in United States District Court for the District of

Colorado, along with his petition to proceed in forma pauperis

and an order dismissing the civil action for failure to comply 1 with the in forma pauperis order. The final exhibit is the 2 single page document -- the request for administrative remedy 3 filed by Mr. Savage in MCC New York, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: All right, they're admitted. All right, anything further, counsel? 6 7 MR. HOEY: Nothing, Your Honor. MR. TROYER: No, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. I will take a look at the record and we'll hand down an appropriate decision. 10 Mr. Finney, would you please speak with Mr. Hoey, 11 Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Troyer and Ms. Sykes and get a date for 12 13 another hearing in this matter? We need to address some things and it should be done within the next two weeks. 14 15 COURTROOM DEPUTY: I will, Judge. THE COURT: All right? All right, recess. 16 17 (Proceedings concluded, 4:22 a.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

CERTIFICATION

I, Diane Gallagher, court approved transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

______ October 5, 2010

DIANE GALLAGHER

DIANA DOMAN TRANSCRIBING